Coalitions’ Weights in a Dispersed System with Pawlak Conflict Model

Małgorzata Przybyła-Kasperek ()
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Małgorzata Przybyła-Kasperek: University of Silesia

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2020, vol. 29, issue 3, No 6, 549-591

Abstract: Abstract The article addresses the issues related to making decisions by an ensemble of classifiers. Classifiers are built based on local tables, the set of local tables is called a dispersed knowledge. The paper discusses a novel application of Pawlak analysis model to examine the relations between classifiers and to create coalitions of classifiers. Each coalition has access to some aggregated knowledge on the basis of which joint decisions are made. Various types of coalitions are formed—a strong coalitions consisting of a large number and significant classifiers, and a weak coalitions consisting of insignificant classifiers. The new contributions of the paper is a systematical investigation of the weights of coalitions that influence the final decision. Four different method of calculating the strength of the coalitions have been applied. Each of these methods consider another aspect of the structure of the coalitions. Generally, it has been experimentally confirmed that, for a method that correctly identifies the relations between base classifiers, the use of coalitions weights improves the quality of classification. More specifically, it has been statistically confirmed that the best results are generated by the weighting method that is based on the size of the coalitions and the method based on the unambiguous of the decisions.

Keywords: Conflict analysis; Dispersed knowledge; Multiple classifiers; Coalitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09667-1

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