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Simple Majorities with Voice but No Vote

José Carlos R. Alcantud ()
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José Carlos R. Alcantud: University of Salamanca

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2020, vol. 29, issue 5, No 1, 803-822

Abstract: Abstract Oligarchic majority rules bring the voice but no vote principle into effect. We prove characterizations of the oligarchic majority rules for both fixed and unrestricted societies and a binary agenda. This is a general class of rules that includes the simple majority rule as well as dictatorships. Suitable sets of axioms identify a subsociety whose members have voice but no vote, and valid votes are aggregated by the majority rule.

Keywords: Majority rule; Voting; Oligarchy; Dictatorship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09663-5

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