A Multivariate Minimum Cost Consensus Model for Negotiations of Holdout Demolition

Yong Liu (), Ting Zhou () and Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest ()
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Yong Liu: Jiangnan University
Ting Zhou: Jiangnan University
Jeffrey Yi-Lin Forrest: Slippery Rock University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2020, vol. 29, issue 5, No 4, 899 pages

Abstract: Abstract Incidences of holdouts, as group events, have appeared most frequently in many countries. The underlying cause of these occurrences of high frequency has been closely related to multiple objectives or various conflicts of interest of stakeholders. Each negotiation of holdout demolition represents a typical group consensus problem with the outcome greatly influenced by multiple objectives or variables of the decision makers. In order to effectively deal with such difficult problems, we construct a multivariate, minimum cost consensus model based on interval number programming constrained with random chances by jointly employing various approaches, such as minimum cost consensus model, multivariate planning, stochastic opportunity constrained programming and interval numbers. After the theoretical development, this paper employs the established method to solve the problem of holdout demolition of particular town A.

Keywords: Holdout demolition; Negotiation; Group consensus; Minimum cost consensus; Multivariate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09683-1

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