Adjacent Downstream Compensation Method of Sharing Polluted Rivers

Dongshuang Hou (), Qianqian Kong (), Xia Zhang () and Hao Sun ()
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Dongshuang Hou: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Qianqian Kong: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Xia Zhang: Northwestern Polytechnical University
Hao Sun: Northwestern Polytechnical University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, vol. 30, issue 1, No 11, 265 pages

Abstract: Abstract To clean up the pollutants in cross-boundary rivers needs the collaborative actions among different agents involved. In our paper, we deal with the river pollution problem in a cooperative situation. We first introduce the adjacent downstream compensation method by considering the bargaining behavior between any two neighbour agents, which reconciles two famous doctrines in the international disputes, i.e., the Absolute Territorial Sovereignty theory and the Unlimited Territorial Integrity theory. Then we prove the coincidence of the adjacent downstream compensation method and the Shapley value of the corresponding responsibility game. By studying the concavity of the river pollution cost sharing game, we illustrate the stability of the adjacent downstream compensation method.

Keywords: Game theory; Cost allocation; Polluted river; Adjacent downstream compensation method; Shapley value; 91A12; C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-020-09715-w

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