On the Difficulty of Budget Allocation in Claims Problems with Indivisible Items and Prices

Teresa Estañ, Natividad Llorca, Ricardo Martinez () and Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano
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Teresa Estañ: Centro de Investigación Operativa (CIO), Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche
Natividad Llorca: Centro de Investigación Operativa (CIO), Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2021, vol. 30, issue 5, No 7, 1133-1159

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we study the class of claims problems where the amount to be divided is perfectly divisible and claims are made on indivisible units of several items. Each item has a price, and the available amount falls short to be able to cover all the claims at the given prices. We propose several properties that may be of interest in this particular framework. These properties represent the common principles of fairness, efficiency, and non-manipulability by merging or splitting. Efficiency is our focal principle, which is formalized by means of two axioms: non-wastefulness and Pareto efficiency. We show that some combinations of the properties we consider are compatible, others are not.

Keywords: Claims problems; Indivisible items; Equal treatment of equals; Non-wastefulness; Manipulability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-021-09750-1

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