Dovish and Hawkish Influence in Distributive and Integrative Negotiations: The Role of (A)symmetry in Constituencies
Hillie Aaldering () and
Shirli Kopelman
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Hillie Aaldering: University of Amsterdam
Shirli Kopelman: University of Michigan
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2022, vol. 31, issue 1, No 6, 136 pages
Abstract:
Abstract Dovish and hawkish constituency pressures influence representative negotiations. Dovish constituency voices promote a collaborative and problem-solving approach, but can also allow for exploitation in negotiations. Hawkish voices encourage a competitive approach, but may leave value on the table. These dynamics are investigated in four experiments. In two interactive dyadic-negotiation experiments (Experiments 1 & 2; N = 186 and N = 220), we investigated how constituency pressures influenced outcomes in two negotiation settings (distributive and integrative). Representatives of dovish constituencies reached higher negotiation outcomes than representatives of hawkish constituencies, when facing a representative with a similar constituency (Experiment 1). However, when representatives with a dovish constituency met with representatives of a hawkish constituency, dovish representatives reached lower gains in both negotiation settings (Experiment 2). This hawkish advantage was replicated in two online scenario studies (Experiments 3 & 4; N = 248 and N = 319). There was no consistent empirical support for the role of a potential future interaction in eliciting representatives’ concessions (Experiment 1–3), however, an absence of accountability to constituents reduced representatives’ competitiveness, irrespective of whom they represented (Experiment 4). Theoretical and practical implications for labor relations, diplomacy, and business negotiations are discussed.
Keywords: Negotiation; Integrative; Distributive; Representative; Constituency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:31:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-021-09759-6
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-021-09759-6
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