Using the Shapley Value to Mitigate the Emergency Rescue Risk for Hazardous Materials

Ginger Y. Ke, Xun-Feng Hu () and Xiao-Long Xue
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Ginger Y. Ke: Memorial University of Newfoundland
Xun-Feng Hu: Guangzhou University
Xiao-Long Xue: Guangzhou University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2022, vol. 31, issue 1, No 7, 137-152

Abstract: Abstract Due to the catastrophic consequence of possible incidents caused by the storage and transportation of hazardous materials, effectively mitigating such risks is of vital importance. This paper proposes a gradual-coverage game describing the situation of locating emergency facilities, to which the Shapley value can be used to evaluate the candidate locations. To be specific, the rescue risk and utility are assessed in terms of the response time to construct a gradual-coverage game. Then, we characterize the Shapley value by proposing two new axioms. Furthermore, to ensure that the analytical model can be practically applied to real-world situations, an algorithm for locating emergency facilities is designed based on the properties of the Shapley value, which is then tested for efficiency.

Keywords: Risk mitigation; Game theory; Shapley value; Emergency response; Hazardous materials (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-021-09760-z

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