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Reformulation of Public Help Index θ Using Null Player Free Winning Coalitions

Izabella Stach ()
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Izabella Stach: AGH University of Science and Technology

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2022, vol. 31, issue 2, No 3, 317-334

Abstract: Abstract This paper proposes a new representation for the Public Help Index θ (briefly, PHI θ). Based on winning coalitions, the PHI θ index was introduced by Bertini et al. in (2008). The goal of this article is to reformulate the PHI θ index using null player free winning coalitions. The set of these coalitions unequivocally defines a simple game. Expressing the PHI θ index by the winning coalitions that do not contain null players allows us in a transparent way to show the parts of the power assigned to null and non-null players in a simple game. Moreover, this new representation may imply a reduction of computational cost (in the sense of space complexity) in algorithms to compute the PHI θ index if at least one of the players is a null player. We also discuss some relationships among the Holler index, the PHI θ index, and the gnp index (based on null player free winning coalitions) proposed by Álvarez-Mozos et al. in (2015).

Keywords: Power indices; Public goods; Simple game; Weighted game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-021-09769-4

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