A Multi-Criteria and Multi-Agent Framework for supporting complex decision-making processes

Alexandre Bevilacqua Leoneti (), René Bañares-Alcántara, Eduardo Cleto Pires and Sonia Valle Walter Borges Oliveira
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Alexandre Bevilacqua Leoneti: University of São Paulo
René Bañares-Alcántara: University of Oxford
Eduardo Cleto Pires: University of São Paulo
Sonia Valle Walter Borges Oliveira: University of São Paulo

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2022, vol. 31, issue 5, No 5, 1025-1050

Abstract: Abstract A framework for modeling multi-criteria and multi-agent decision making processes as a non-cooperative game including a phase for solving the game by using the concept of equilibrium solution is presented. In the presence of a non-singular solution, the framework includes a phase for refining the solution by the application of a social welfare function. The framework is named Multi-Criteria and Multi-Agent Framework. The framework makes possible the strategic performance in complex decision-making, creating transparency within the process of selecting alternatives that are under evaluation in a multi-criteria perspective by agents with heterogeneous preferences. This paper includes a simulation to demonstrate the applicability of the framework to a complex engineering problem such as the choice of a Wastewater Treatment Plant for a municipality. Convergence of choices of five experts that participated in the simulation was demonstrated by the application of the framework.

Keywords: MCDM; Game theory; Utility function; Equilibrium selection problem; Social welfare functions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-022-09785-y

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