Normed Negative Voting to Depolarize Politics

Karthik H. Shankar ()
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Karthik H. Shankar: Boston University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2022, vol. 31, issue 6, No 1, 1097-1120

Abstract: Abstract Are the voter preferences clearly heard in a plurality voting system? Alternate voting schemes wherein the voters rank their choices instead of just voting for their first preference certainly capture the voter preferences in a richer format, but they do not explicitly capture the negative preferences. Here we propose a voting scheme that blends negative voting within a cumulative voting system. In this scheme, we can simultaneously decipher the popularity as well as the polarity of each candidate contesting in the election, giving us a two dimensional view of the candidates. An incentive structure can be built into voting system whereby we can penalize the candidates for their polarity and discourage polarizing campaign rhetorics. Theoretically, this could help depolarize the heated political environment and level the playing field for third party candidates.

Keywords: Alternate voting methods; Strategic voting; Negative voting; Polarizing campaigns; Cumulative voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-022-09799-6

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