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The Generalized Shapley Value of Cooperative Games as a Social Preference Function

Ritu Dutta, Souvik Roy () and Surajit Borkotokey ()
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Souvik Roy: Indian Statistical Institute
Surajit Borkotokey: Dibrugarh University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2023, vol. 32, issue 2, No 2, 277-300

Abstract: Abstract We introduce a cardinal social preference rule (CSPR) which accounts for interpersonal comparisons of alternatives in groups and satisfies several desirable properties. The proposed rule transforms voters’ individual ordinal preferences to obtain a score for each alternative given by the generalized Shapley value of cooperative games with transferable utilities. Since every CSPR induces an ordinal social preference rule (OSPR) in a natural way, the score vector, we propose in our model, induces a weak preference on the set of alternatives. The proposed CSPR is characterized by using some intuitive axioms.

Keywords: Cooperative game; Generalized Shapley value; Cardinal social preference rule; Ordinal social preference rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-022-09809-7

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