A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems

Sylvain Béal, Sylvain Ferrières () and Philippe Solal
Additional contact information
Sylvain Ferrières: Université de Saint-Etienne

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2023, vol. 32, issue 4, No 8, 965-985

Abstract: Abstract A coalitional ranking problem is described by a weak order on the set of nonempty coalitions of a given agent set. A social ranking is a weak order on the set of agents. We consider social rankings that are consistent with stable/core partitions. A partition is stable if there is no coalition better ranked in the coalitional ranking than the rank of the cell of each of its members in the partition. The core-partition social ranking solution assigns to each coalitional ranking problem the set of social rankings such that there is a core-partition satisfying the following condition: a first agent gets a higher rank than a second agent if and only if the cell to which the first agent belongs is better ranked in the coalitional ranking than the cell to which the second agent belongs in the partition. We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core-partition social ranking and an algorithm to compute the associated social rankings.

Keywords: Coalitional ranking problem; Social ranking; Core partition; Axiomatic characterization; Hedonic games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-023-09832-2 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
Working Paper: A Core-Partition Ranking Solution to Coalitional Ranking Problems (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:32:y:2023:i:4:d:10.1007_s10726-023-09832-2

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-023-09832-2

Access Statistics for this article

Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten

More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().