Maximum Utility Consensus with Inequity Aversion in Social Network Group Decision Making

Yangjingjing Zhang (), Xia Chen (), Mengting Gao () and Yucheng Dong ()
Additional contact information
Yangjingjing Zhang: Xihua University
Xia Chen: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Mengting Gao: University of Electronic Science and Technology of China
Yucheng Dong: Sichuan University

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2024, vol. 33, issue 5, No 8, 1115-1142

Abstract: Abstract Consensus is an essential topic in social network group decision making (SNGDM). In the consensus process, maximizing the group utility is conducive to allowing the moderator to efficiently consider the interests of all parties. However, this issue is neglected in most of the extant studies. Inequity aversion is a common behavior that the individuals often exhibit in the group context, which has a significant impact on the utility of individuals in the decision group. Motivated by this, in this paper we investigate the maximum utility consensus problem with inequity aversion in SNGDM. Firstly, we define the individuals’ utility functions with inequity aversion in the consensus process of SNGDM. Notably, in the proposed utility function, the envy and guilt degrees among individuals are determined by their node similarities. Afterward, we present a novel maximum utility consensus model in SNGDM based on inequity aversion (i.e., MUCM-IA) to maximize the utility of the whole network group. Additionally, some simulation studies and comparative analyses are carried out to explore how inequity aversion affects the outcomes of consensus reaching. Finally, an application in cooperation mode selection of supermarket alliance with real social network data is given to prove the validity of our proposal.

Keywords: Group decision making; Social network; Maximum utility consensus; Inequity aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-024-09887-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:33:y:2024:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-024-09887-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09887-9

Access Statistics for this article

Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten

More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().