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A Third-Party Conflict Mediation Model Considering the Differences in Preference Concessions Within the GMCR Paradigm

Zilong Huang (), Shinan Zhao (), Jun Wu () and Sharafat Ali ()
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Zilong Huang: Jiangsu University of Science and Technology
Shinan Zhao: Jiangsu University of Science and Technology
Jun Wu: Jiangsu University of Science and Technology
Sharafat Ali: Government Graduate College Kot Sultan

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2025, vol. 34, issue 2, No 4, 297-328

Abstract: Abstract In conflict mediation, guiding stakeholders to make concessions among the three preference relations (more preferred, less preferred, and equally preferred) presents varying degrees of difficulty. This study proposes a novel algebraic expression where a specific numerical value can represent all scenarios of transitions among preference relations to accurately quantify the differences in preference concessions made by decision-makers. Furthermore, considering the degrees of difficulty in preference relation transitions, an enhanced third-party conflict mediation model is purposefully constructed to determine the minimal preference concessions needed to achieve the target state of mediation. Finally, we implement the proposed third-party conflict resolution approach in mediating the doctor–patient dispute to demonstrate its practical application.

Keywords: Graph model for conflict resolution; Preference concession; Third-party mediation; Doctor–patient conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s10726-024-09914-9

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