Inventive Multi-Issue Negotiation: A TRIZ-Aided Behavioral Approach with the Wolf Game and Modified Even-Swaps
Koray Altun ()
Additional contact information
Koray Altun: Bursa Technical University
Group Decision and Negotiation, 2025, vol. 34, issue 5, No 4, 1073-1114
Abstract:
Abstract Negotiation in complex multi-issue scenarios requires a structured and adaptive approach that balances conflicting priorities while incorporating behavioral dynamics. Traditional decision-making models often assume that predefined alternatives are available, which does not reflect real-world negotiation complexities. This study introduces the Wolf Game Negotiation Model (WGNM), an inventive negotiation framework that integrates TRIZ-based inventive principles (IPs) with behavioral adaptation strategies. WGNM constructs negotiation pathways dynamically by leveraging psychological positioning (IP13), segmentation (IP1) resource utilization (IP25), and tactical adaptation (IP21) to refine decision alternatives in real-time. Unlike static compromise-based models, WGNM enables iterative trade-off adjustments, allowing negotiators to systematically manage concessions while maintaining strategic control. The study also examines the integration of Modified Even-Swaps Mechanism (MESM) with WGNM, demonstrating their complementary strengths in decision structuring and adaptive negotiation. A case study in the injection molding industry illustrates how WGNM enhances negotiation efficiency by bridging the gap between decision support methodologies and behavioral negotiation models. The findings highlight the importance of inventive problem-solving in dynamic negotiations, leading to superior outcomes in cost, efficiency, and long-term strategic collaboration.
Keywords: Behavioral decision-making; Multi-issue negotiation; TRIZ; Wolf game; Inventive principles (IPs) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10726-025-09943-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:grdene:v:34:y:2025:i:5:d:10.1007_s10726-025-09943-y
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/10726/PS2
DOI: 10.1007/s10726-025-09943-y
Access Statistics for this article
Group Decision and Negotiation is currently edited by Gregory E. Kersten
More articles in Group Decision and Negotiation from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().