On Voting Power Indices and a Class of Probability Distributions: With applications to EU data

Sven Berg
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Sven Berg: University of Lund

Group Decision and Negotiation, 1999, vol. 8, issue 1, No 2, 17-31

Abstract: Abstract Properties of a class of voting power indices, defined as the expected number of swings under a probability model, are discussed. For decisive voting games swing sets exhibit symmetries which can be used to characterize the voting power indices. Numerical illustrations based on EU Council data are provided.

Keywords: voting power index; decisive game; Pólya-Eggenberger distribution; EU Council of Ministers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008673712816

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