Evolutionary Stability in the Ultimatum Game

Ralf Peters
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Ralf Peters: University of Hamburg

Group Decision and Negotiation, 2000, vol. 9, issue 4, No 4, 315-324

Abstract: Abstract Biologically motivated concepts of evolutionary stability, like the ESS, consider robustness against tiny invasions of mutants. This paper considers larger invasions and proposes an extended stability calculus. The new concept is applied to the ultimatum game and gives an evolutionary explanation for the emergence of egalitarian, "fair" behaviour.

Keywords: evolutionary stability; ultimatum game; fairness; JEL classification; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1008728906472

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