Success, Survival and Probabilistic Voting: The Case of a ruling Party

Artyom Jelnov and Pavel Jelnov

Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, 2019, vol. 36, issue 3, No 5, 209-226

Abstract: Abstract In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being on the winning side in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the voting power literature widely assumed.

Keywords: Coalitions; Cabinet duration; Shapley–Shubik index; Rae index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Working Paper: Voting Power and Survival: The Case of a Ruling Party (2019)
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DOI: 10.1007/s41412-019-00091-8

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