Voting Power and Survival: The Case of a Ruling Party
Artyom Jelnov () and
Pavel Jelnov ()
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Artyom Jelnov: Ariel University
No 12354, IZA Discussion Papers from Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
In this article, we empirically study the survival of the ruling party in parliamentary democracies using a hazard rate model. We define survival of a crisis as being successful in a critical vote in the parliament. We develop a general probabilistic model of political crises and test it empirically. We find that during crises, parties in the parliament are likely to vote independently of each other. Thus, we receive as an empirical result what the previous voting power literature assumed.
Keywords: voting power; coalitions; cabinet duration; Shapley-Shubik index; Rae index (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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