Occupational gender segregation in an equilibrium search model
IZA Journal of Labor Economics, 2015, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-14
This paper develops an equilibrium search model to explain gender asymmetry in occupational distribution. Workers’ utility depends on salary and working hours, and women have a greater aversion to longer working hours than men. Simulations indicate that women crowd into shorter-hour, lower-paying jobs than men. If employers discriminate against women, offers are tailored more toward the working-hour preferences of men by requiring longer working hours. Similarly, if women have a disutility factor in their utility toward positions with a higher proportion of men, fewer women work at these jobs. In both cases, gender segregation is reinforced. JEL classification: E24, J16, J64, J71 Copyright Usui. 2015
Keywords: Equilibrium search; Gender preferences; Employer discrimination; Employee discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:izalbr:v:4:y:2015:i:1:p:1-14:10.1186/s40172-015-0028-2
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