Supply chain coordination with auctions

Petr Fiala ()
Additional contact information
Petr Fiala: University of Economics, Prague

Journal of Business Economics, 2016, vol. 86, issue 1, No 9, 155-171

Abstract: Abstract Supply chain is a decentralized system where material, financial and information flows connect economic agents. There is much inefficiency in supply chain behavior. Recently, considerable attention of researchers is drown to provide some incentives to adjust the relationship of supply chain agents to coordinate the supply chain, i.e., the total profit of the decentralized supply chain is equal to that achieved under a centralized system. There is a vast literature on supply chain coordination recently. Most of coordination mechanisms are based on game theory models and contracts between agents of the supply chain. However, little work has been done on using auctions for supply chain coordination. Auctions are important market mechanisms for the allocation of goods and services. A complex trading model between layers of the supply chain is proposed in the paper. The model is based on so called multidimensional auctions. There is possible to formulate multidimensional auctions as mathematical programming problems. Iterative methods are used to solve the problems.

Keywords: Supply chain; Coordination; Auctions; Complex trading model; Iterative methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 D44 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11573-015-0788-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jbecon:v:86:y:2016:i:1:d:10.1007_s11573-015-0788-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/journal/11573

DOI: 10.1007/s11573-015-0788-y

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Business Economics is currently edited by Günter Fandel

More articles in Journal of Business Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().