Strategic risk in supply chain contract design

Abdolkarim Sadrieh and Guido Voigt ()
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Guido Voigt: Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg

Journal of Business Economics, 2017, vol. 87, issue 1, No 6, 125-153

Abstract: Abstract Supply chains facing asymmetric information can either operate in a cooperative mode with information and benefit sharing or can choose a non-cooperative form of interaction and align their incentives via screening contracts. In the cooperative mode, supply chain efficiency can be achieved, but high levels of trust and trustworthiness are required. In the non-cooperative mode, the contract mechanism guarantees a second best supply chain performance, but only if all parties choose their equilibrium strategies without trembles. Experimental evidence, however, shows that both operating modes often fail due to strategic risk. Cooperation is disrupted by deceptive signals and the lack of trust, whereas non-cooperative strategies suffer from persistent out-of-equilibrium behavior. We present two means to reduce strategic risk. First, a punishment mechanism leads to a better matching of trust and trustworthiness and supports the cooperative operating mode. Second, an enforcement of self-selection supports the non-cooperative equilibrium by increasing the attractiveness of screening contracts. We find that supply chain performance can benefit from reduced strategic risk in either operating mode.

Keywords: Behavioral operations management; Contracting; Asymmetric information; Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C72 D22 D82 L21 M21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11573-015-0790-4

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