Delegated bargaining in a competitive agent market: an experimental study
Amy K. Choy,
John Hamman (),
Ronald R. King and
Roberto Weber ()
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Amy K. Choy: Washington University
Ronald R. King: Washington University
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2016, vol. 2, issue 1, 22-35
Abstract We examine a variant of ultimatum bargaining in which principals may delegate their proposal decision to agents hired from a competitive market. Contrary to several prior studies, we find that when principals must use agents, the resulting proposals are significantly higher than when principals make proposals themselves. In reconciling our results with prior findings, we conclude that both the rejection power afforded to responders and the structure of principal-agent contracts can play significant roles in the nature of outcomes under delegated bargaining.
Keywords: Bargaining; Delegation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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