Time for helping

Anastasia Danilov and Timo Vogelsang

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2016, vol. 2, issue 1, No 4, 36-47

Abstract: Abstract This study investigates whether individuals engage in prosocial behavior when it requires an investment of their time, but not money. In a laboratory experiment with rigorous anonymity arrangements, senders receive their payoff at the beginning. They may then engage in a tedious task to increase the earnings of exogenously disadvantaged recipients who otherwise receive no earnings. We find that senders are willing to sacrifice time to benefit recipients. Whether or not the recipient is present in the laboratory during the working time does not alter this decision. However, in a treatment variation some senders also display antisocial behavior.

Keywords: Laboratory experiment; Social preferences; Time; Opportunity costs; Dictator game; Non-monetary giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 J22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-015-0020-4

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