Framing effects on bribery behaviour: experimental evidence from China and Uganda

Alessio Gaggero (), Simon Appleton and Lina Song ()

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, vol. 4, issue 1, No 7, 86-97

Abstract: Abstract In this study we investigate the effect of framing on bribery behaviour. To do this, we replicate Barr and Serra (Exp Econ, 12(4):488–503, (2009) and carry out a simple one-shot bribery game that mimics corruption. In one treatment, we presented the experiment in a framed version, in which wording was embedded with social context; in the other, we removed the social context and presented the game in a neutral manner. The contribution of this paper is that it offers a comparison of framing effects in two highly corrupt countries: China and Uganda. Our results provide evidence of strong and significant framing effects for Uganda, but not for China.

Keywords: Framing; Bribery behaviour (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D73 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0049-2

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