A shared identity promotes herding in an information cascade game
Sebastian Berger (),
Christoph Feldhaus () and
Additional contact information
Sebastian Berger: University of Bern
Christoph Feldhaus: University of Münster
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, vol. 4, issue 1, 63-72
Abstract Our research addresses the effect of shared vs. mixed group identities in an information cascade game. We vary whether subjects always choose after a decision maker who shares the same identity or after a decision maker with a different identity. We find that subjects’ inclination to follow their predecessor is stronger in groups uniquely consisting of ingroup members compared to mixed groups. We relate this result to recent social cognition research.
Keywords: Information cascades; Herding; Group identity; Social cognition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D03 D70 D83 G02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40881-018-0050-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jesaex:v:4:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-018-0050-9
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Journal of the Economic Science Association is currently edited by Nikos Nikiforakis and Robert Slonim
More articles in Journal of the Economic Science Association from Springer, Economic Science Association Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().