Guilt averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioral motivations in the trust game

Yola Engler (), Rudolf Kerschbamer and Lionel Page
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Yola Engler: Queensland University of Technology and QuBE

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2018, vol. 4, issue 1, No 1, 14 pages

Abstract: Abstract For the trust game, recent models of belief-dependent motivations make opposite predictions regarding the correlation between back transfers and second-order beliefs of the trustor: while reciprocity models predict a negative correlation, guilt-aversion models predict a positive one. This paper tests the hypothesis that the inconclusive results in the previous studies investigating the reaction of trustees to their beliefs are due to the fact that reciprocity and guilt aversion are behaviorally relevant for different subgroups and that their impact cancels out in the aggregate. We find little evidence in support of this hypothesis and conclude that type heterogeneity is unlikely to explain previous results.

Keywords: Behavioral game theory; Experiment; Intention based preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 C70 C91 D63 D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Working Paper: Guilt-averse or reciprocal? Looking at behavioural motivations in the trust game (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-018-0051-8

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