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Framing effects in the prisoner’s dilemma but not in the dictator game

Sebastian Goerg (), David Rand () and Gari Walkowitz ()
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David Rand: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Gari Walkowitz: Technical University of Munich

Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2020, vol. 6, issue 1, No 1, 12 pages

Abstract: Abstract We systematically investigate prisoner’s dilemma and dictator games with valence framing. We find that give versus take frames influence subjects’ behavior and beliefs in the prisoner’s dilemma games but not in the dictator games. We conclude that valence framing has a stronger impact on behavior in strategic interactions, i.e., in the prisoner’s dilemma game, than in allocation tasks without strategic interaction, i.e., in the dictator game.

Keywords: Prisoner’s dilemma; Dictator game; Framing; Give; Take; Cooperation; Generosity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A13 C72 C91 F51 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: Framing effects in the Prisoner's Dilemma but not in the Dictator Game (2017) Downloads
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-019-00081-1

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