Theft and Deterrence

William Harbaugh (), Naci Mocan and Michael Visser ()

Journal of Labor Research, 2013, vol. 34, issue 4, 389-407

Abstract: We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

Keywords: Experiments; Crime; Larceny; Theft; Deterrence; Penalty; Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Working Paper: Theft and Deterrence (2011)
Working Paper: Theft and Deterrence (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jlabre:v:34:y:2013:i:4:p:389-407

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DOI: 10.1007/s12122-013-9169-x

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