Theft and Deterrence

William Harbaugh (), Naci Mocan and Michael S. Visser

No 17059, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny, with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection. We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore, the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is larger.

JEL-codes: J0 K14 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
Note: CH EH LE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as “ Theft and Deterrence ,” with Bill Harbaugh and Mike Visser. (NBER Working Paper No: 17059). Journal of Labor Research . December 2013. Vol. 34 (4), pp. 389 - 407.

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Journal Article: Theft and Deterrence (2013)
Working Paper: Theft and Deterrence (2011)
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