Relaxing Pareto optimality in economic environments

Jerry S. Kelly and Donald E. Campbell
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Jerry S. Kelly: Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13244-1090, USA
Donald E. Campbell: Department of Economics and the Thomas Jefferson Program in Public Policy, The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795, USA

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 1, 115-130

Abstract: The individual preference domain is the family of profiles of economic preferences on the set of allocations of public or private goods, or both. The agenda domain assumption allows for a finite lower bound on the size of a feasible set. If a social choice correspondence satisfies nonimposition, Arrow's choice axiom, and independence of infeasible alternatives then it is directly or inversely dictatorial, or null.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: October 10, 1995; revised version: June 20, 1996
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