The geometry of inductive reasoning in games

Diana Richards
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Diana Richards: Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 1, 185-193

Abstract: This paper contributes to the recent focus on dynamics in noncooperative games when players use inductive learning. The most well-known inductive learning rule, Brown's fictitious play, is known to converge for $2 \times 2$ games, yet many examples exist where fictitious play reasoning fails to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Building on ideas from chaotic dynamics, this paper develops a geometric conceptualization of instability in games, allowing for a reinterpretation of existing results and suggesting avenues for new results.

JEL-codes: C72 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
Note: Received: October 27, 1995 revised version May 2, 1996
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