Generalized assignment models: with an applicationto technology transfer

Prabal Ray Chaudhuri
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Prabal Ray Chaudhuri: CSDILE, ITDD, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi - 110067, INDIA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Prabal Roy Chowdhury ()

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 2, 335-360

Abstract: We consider a generalized assignment model where the payoffs depend on the number of matchings that take place. We formulate a simple non-cooperative game and look for subgame perfect equilibrium of this model. Existence is established for a wide class of games. We also look at a refinement criterion which, for the standard assignment model, selects the $p$-optimal outcome as the unique equilibrium. We then apply these concepts to a model of technology transfer between domestic and foreign firms.

Date: 1997
Note: Received: June 24, 1994; revised version October 12, 1995
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