Efficiency and incentive compatibility in differential information economies

Guangsug Hahn and Nicholas C. Yannelis
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Guangsug Hahn: Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA
Nicholas C. Yannelis: Department of Economics, University of Illinois, Champaign, IL 61820, USA

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 3, 383-411

Abstract: We introduce several efficiency notions depending on what kind of expected utility is used (ex ante, interim, ex post) and on how agents share their private information, i.e., whether they redistribute their initial endowments based on their own private information, or common knowledge information, or pooled information. Moreover, we introduce several Bayesian incentive compatibility notions and identify several efficiency concepts which maintain (coalitional) Bayesian incentive compatibility.

Date: 1997-09-16
Note: Received: March 25, 1996; revised September 5, 1996
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