Contract renegotiation in a continuous state space

Ed Nosal

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 3, 413-435

Abstract: When players are unable to write complete state contingent contracts it is shown, within the context of a non-cooperative contracting-renegotiation game, that the only subgame perfect equilibrium allocations are those that correspond to the set of first-best allocations. Players are able to implement this set of allocations by signing an initial contract that is subsequently renegotiated in all states of the world. The contracting-renegotiation problem is complicated in an interesting way by assuming that the state space is continuous. The issue of the existence of an initial contract, that is subsequently renegotiated to the set of first-best allocations, must be resolved. Unlike Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey [1994], the results here do not require nor depend upon the comonotonicity of the objective functions.

JEL-codes: C72 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-09-16
Note: Received: January 27, 1995; revised version July 1, 1996
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