A resolution of N -person prisoners' dilemma
Ko Nishihara
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Ko Nishihara: Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, 8-19-1, Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-80, JAPAN
Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 3, 540 pages
Abstract:
The purpose of this paper is to show that cooperation is possible in N-person prisoners' dilemma if players have incomplete information on the order of their moves. We consider a modified version of N-person prisoners' dilemma in which players sequentially move in the order determined by Nature, and during the play they get some information about others. We provide an information partition and a condition of payoffs for which cooperation is attained in an equilibrium. Further, for the case that full cooperation is not attained, we examine the largest partial cooperation which is achieved in an equilibrium.
JEL-codes: C72 D62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997-09-16
Note: Received: March 5, 1995; revised version August 11, 1996
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