Uniqueness of the index for Nash equilibria of two-player games

Robert Wilson () and Srihari Govindan

Economic Theory, 1997, vol. 10, issue 3, 549 pages

Abstract: Given a map whose roots are the Nash equilibria of a game, each component of the equilibrium set has an associated index, defined as the local degree of the map. This note shows that for a two-player game, every map with the same roots induces the same index. Moreover, this index agrees with the Shapley index constructed from the Lemke-Howson algorithm.

Date: 1997-09-16
Note: Received: May 30, 1996; revised version June 25, 1996
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