Strong rationalizability for two-player noncooperative games

Niels Anthonisen ()
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Niels Anthonisen: Department of Economics, Mount Allison University, Sackville, New Brunswick, CANADA EOA 3CO

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 1, 143-169

Abstract: The paper introduces a version of rationalizability that ignores strategies that are supported by negligible sets of beliefs, where a negligible set is one whose Lebesgue measure is zero. The theory is developed solely for the special case of point rationalizability; conditions are then derived under which point rationalizability entails no loss of generality. When these conditions obtain, the predictions yielded by this approach are often (although not always) a significant reduction over what is predicted by rationalizability.

Date: 1998-12-04
Note: Received: September 10 1996; revised version: July 18, 1997
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