Payoff equivalence between Bayesian and ex post individually rational dominant strategy mechanisms

Georgia Kosmopoulou

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 1, 229-237

Abstract: An efficient, interim individually rational, ex post budget balanced Bayesian mechanism is shown to be payoff equivalent to an ex post individually rational and ex ante budget balanced dominant strategy mechanism. This result simplifies the search for mechanisms that implement efficient allocation rules by pointing to a class of Groves mechanisms. It eliminates the strict requirement of common knowledge of priors and can be applied to many problems of incomplete information.

Keywords: Allocative; efficiency; ·; Bayesian; incentive; compatible; mechanisms; ·; Dominant; strategy; implementation; ·; Payoff; equivalence. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12-04
Note: Received: October 22 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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