Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited

Kala Krishna ()

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 2, 377-391

Abstract: This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.

Keywords: Sequential; auctions; ·; Endogenous; valuations; ·; Evolution; of; market; structure. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-17
Note: Received: March 14, 1997; revised version: December 1, 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9013002/90130377.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
Working Paper: Auctions with Endogenous Valuations, The Snowball Effect Revisited (1990)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:2:p:377-391

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().