Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in N -person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves

Ko Nishihara ()
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Ko Nishihara: Faculty of Economics, Fukuoka University, Nanakuma, Jonan-ku, Fukuoka 814-80, JAPAN

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 2, 483-494

Abstract: Nishihara [3] showed that N-person prisoners' dilemma has a cooperative Nash equilibrium, if the players decide their actions sequentially in the order determined by Nature under a certain information structure, and if each player's payoffs satisfy a certain inequality. This paper examines the stability of this cooperative equilibrium against two matters: players' slight mistakes and deviations by coalitions. The main results are as follows: (i) if the inequality on each player's payoffs strictly holds, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strictly proper equilibrium; (ii) if N\leq3, and if full cooperation is Pareto efficient in N-person prisoners' dilemma, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium; (iii) the cooperative equilibrium is in general a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Cooperation; in (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-02-17
Note: Received: June 23, 1997; revised version: December 2, 1997
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