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Bargaining with asymmetric information in non-stationary markets

Daniel Trefler

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 3, 577-601

Abstract: The Rubinstein and Wolinsky bargaining-in-markets framework is modified by the introduction of asymmetric information and non-stationarity. Non-stationarity is introduced in the form of an arbitrary stochastic Markov process which captures the dynamics of market entry and pairwise matching. A new technique is used for establishing existence and characterizing the unique outcome of a non-stationary market equilibrium. The impact of market supply and demand on bilateral bargaining outcomes and matching probabilities is explored. The results are useful for examining such questions as why coordination failures and macroeconomic output fluctuations are correlated with real and monetary shocks.

Keywords: Non-cooperative; bargaining; Matching; ·; Asymmetric; information; ·; Non-stationarity; ·; Output; fluctuations.; · (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04-15
Note: Received: July 22, 1994; revised version: January 21, 1998
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