Revealed group preferences on non-convex choice problems
Efe Ok and
Lin Zhou
Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 3, 687 pages
Abstract:
This paper studies the conditions under which the basic results of the revealed preference theory can be established on the domain of choice problems which include non-convex feasible sets; the exercise is closely related to the works of Peters and Wakker (1991) and Bossert (1994). We show that while no continuous choice function can satisfy strong Pareto optimality over the class of all compact and comprehensive choice problems, strong Pareto optimality, Arrow's choice axiom, upper hemicontinuity and a weak compromisation postulate turn out to be necessary and sufficient to represent choice correspondences by continuous, strictly increasing and quasiconcave real-valued functions. Some applications of our main findings to axiomatic bargaining theory are also studied.
Date: 1999-04-15
Note: Received: December 2, 1996; revised version: February 27, 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/9013003/90130671.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
Related works:
Working Paper: Revealed Group Preferences on Non-Convex Choice Problems (1996)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:13:y:1999:i:3:p:671-687
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2
Access Statistics for this article
Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils
More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().