Double implementation in economies with production technologies unknown to the designer

Guoqiang Tian

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 13, issue 3, 689-707

Abstract: This paper considers double implementation of Walrasian allocations and Lindahl allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria for both private and public goods economies when preferences, initial endowments, production technologies, and coalition patterns are all unknown to the designer. It will be noted that the mechanisms presented here are feasible and continuous. In addition, unlike most mechanisms proposed in the literature, our mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies, and thus it is a unified mechanism which is irrespective of the number of agents.

Keywords: Double; implementation; Walrasian; allocations; ·; Lindahl; allocations; ·; Unkown; production; technologies.; · (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-04-15
Note: Received: March 12, 1998; revised version: March 12, 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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