Assignment models and reneging

Prabal Roy Chowdhury (prabalrc@isid.ac.in)

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 14, issue 2, 393-415

Abstract: We consider a non-cooperative assignment model where we show that any subgame perfect equilibrium is stable, and that an appropriate refinement criterion leads to the p-optimal outcome. We then consider a model with reneging and derive some interesting properties of this game. We show that in this case `unraveling' may occur. Furthermore, the resulting outcome can be either stable, or unstable.

Keywords: Assignment models; Reneging; Stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-08-24
Note: Received: July 1, 1997; revised version: May 30, 1998
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