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Manipulation-proof equilibrium in atomless economies with commodity differentiation

Mario Pascoa, Carlos Hervés-Beloso () and Emma Moreno-García

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 14, issue 3, 545-563

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce a perfect competition test which checks the incentives of arbitrarily small coalitions to behave strategically in endowments and preferences. We apply this coalitional incentive compatibility test to atomless economies with a continuum of differentiated commodities. We show that, under thickness conditions, economies with a finite number of types and economies whose set of agents' preferences is compact, pass this perfect competition test. Limiting results for replica economies are also presented.

Keywords: Perfect competition; Continuum economies; Incentive compatibility; Thick markets; Walrasian equilibrium. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D41 D51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-10-14
Note: Received: July 25, 1997; revised version: December 5, 1998
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