Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: A note

Rajat Deb () and Shinji Ohseto ()
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Rajat Deb: Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496, USA
Shinji Ohseto: Department of Economics, Ritsumeikan University, Kusatsu, Shiga 525-8577, JAPAN

Economic Theory, 1999, vol. 14, issue 3, 685-689

Abstract: Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization.

Keywords: Social; choice; function; Strategy-proofness; ·; Individual; rationality; ·; Non-bossiness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-10-14
Note: Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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