An experimental study of information and mixed-strategy play in the three-person matching-pennies game

Arijit Mukherji (), Kevin McCabe and David E. Runkle ()
Additional contact information
Arijit Mukherji: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA
David E. Runkle: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, USA

Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 15, issue 2, 462 pages

Abstract: Recent experiments on mixed-strategy play in experimental games reject the hypothesis that subjects play a mixed strategy even when that strategy is the unique Nash equilibrium prediction. However, in a three-person matching-pennies game played with perfect monitoring and complete payoff information, we cannot reject the hypothesis that subjects play the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Given this support for mixed-strategy play, we then consider two qualitatively different learning theories (sophisticated Bayesian and naive Bayesian) which predict that the amount of information given to subjects will determine whether they can learn to play the predicted mixed strategies. We reject the hypothesis that subjects play the symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium when they do not have complete payoff information. This finding suggests that players did not use sophisticated Bayesian learning to reach the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Bayesian learning; Experimental. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-21
Note: Received: August 9, 1996; revised version: October 21, 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (23)

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/0015002/00150421.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:15:y:2000:i:2:p:421-462

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().