Approval voting in subset elections

James Wiseman ()
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James Wiseman: Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA

Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 15, issue 2, 477-483

Abstract: Approval voting is designed to be "insensitive to numbers" of voters, and likely to elect a Condorcet candidate. However, the result of an election among one group of candidates gives no information about the results of elections among any other groups, even if every voter follows the recommended utility-maximizing strategy, which places strong restrictions on the individual voter's subset ballots. Thus the addition of a single candidate could completely reverse the outcome of an election, or a Condorcet candidate could finish last.

Keywords: Voting; Approval voting; Social choice. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-21
Note: Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998
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