Two simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure
P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Economic Theory, 2000, vol. 15, issue 2, 485-490
Abstract:
Theories of equilibrium selection in non-cooperative games, as well as the notion of risk dominance, depend heavily on the so-called linear tracing procedure. This is the first paper to give direct, simple proofs of the feasibility of the linear tracing procedure. The first proof utilizes a result that is related to Kakutani's fixed point theorem and that is an extension of Browder's fixed point theorem. The second proof shows that it is even possible to avoid the use of correspondences.
Keywords: Non-cooperative game theory; Tracing procedure; Equilibrium selection; Browder's fixed point theorem. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02-21
Note: Received: June 8, 1998; revised version: November 8, 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)
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Related works:
Working Paper: Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure (1997) 
Working Paper: Two Simple Proofs of the Feasibility of the Linear Tracing Procedure (1997) 
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